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In the conclusion to his Classic Art of 1899 – a book which deals mainly with painting - 
Wölfflin outlines four formal characteristics of the classic: 
 
repose, spaciousness, mass and size 
simplification and lucidity 
complexity 
unity and inevitability 
 
The last of these is decisive.  Wölfflin had begun his book with the polemical statement 
that “The word ‘classic’ has, for us, a rather chilly sound.”1  This coldness, I would argue, 
derives from its respect of the notion of unity or identity.  Wölfflin's comparison of 
Ghirlandaio's with Leonardo's Last Supper illustrates this well.  Leonardo’s work is 
presented as “the most popular picture in the whole of Italian art”, having a simplicity and 
expressiveness that “impresses itself upon everyone”.2  Its importance for Wölfflin is 
indicated by its position as the first example given of the classic.  He makes comparison 
with Ghirlandaio’s fresco in the church of Ognissanti in Florence, dating from fifteen years 
earlier.   The similarities – the frontal view, the room shown in perspective, the table – only 
serve to emphasise the radical differences between the styles of the two frescos.  These 
include the centrality of Christ, the relocation of Judas to the far side of the table, and the 
isolation of Christ (St John no longer sleeps on his breast).  All these differences serve one 
aim: to unify Leonardo’s composition and give it a certain inevitability. 
 
To my eye and prejudice, it is the Ghirlandaio which is the masterpiece, and the Leonardo 
which is indeed exemplary of the chilly quality of the classic. It seems to have one aim, 
which is to gather all the components of the composition and subsume them under unity 
or identity: the perspective of the room, the centrality of the painted door or window, the 
centrality of Christ, the subsumption of the disciples to the figure of Christ.  By contrast, as 
Wölfflin says, “Ghirlandaio’s picture is a gathering without a centre”; the centre is left 
empty, and its very emptiness is emphasised by the console supporting the vault above.3  
Wölfflin calls the console “unfortunate”, and says that Ghirlandaio in response to it and 
“without allowing it to embarrass him.. calmly moves his Christ to one side.”4 
 
This seems to me to be a very odd way of analysing what Wölfflin acknowledges is “one of 
the master’s best works.”5  Are we really to believe that Ghirlandaio started his 
composition with the vault and the console and then subsequently had to compromise – 
shockingly without embarrassment – by shifting Christ to one side?  The argument is 
patently unsustainable, but what is interesting here is not the attempt to prove Wölfflin 
wrong but rather the identification of a symptom.  When a writer as rigorous as Wölfflin 
makes an unsustainable argument, this generally indicates something of importance. 
 
                                                 
1 Heinrich Wölfflin, Classic Art, trans. Peter and Linda Murray, London: Phaidon, 1994, xv. 
2 Op. cit., 23. 
3 Op. cit., 25. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Op. cit., 23. 
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On one level, this symptom is the result of contrasting the earlier work with Leonardo’s 
unified composition and the raising of the latter and its strategies to the position of an 
ideal.  However, this late nineteenth century symptom calls to be viewed also at a more 
abstract level of thought.  The depreciation of Ghirlandaio’s last supper seems to me to 
derive from a more general phenomenon - what Nietzsche at around the same time calls 
“nihilism”, a notion which Gilles Deleuze discusses at some length in his 1962 book on the 
philosopher.6  For Deleuze, the Nietzschean notion of nihilism means the depreciation of 
life as it is, in the name of a transcendent value or ideal.7  It means the judging of life as 
being lower than that transcendent value or ideal.  This is almost the opposite of how the 
word nihilism is usually used.  My argument is that Wölfflin is engaging in such a nihilism 
by positing unity, inevitability and the ideal as being that from which the Ghirlandaio falls 
short.  He carries out not merely an empirical comparison between the two frescos, but 
passes clear and more broadly-based judgement on the latter’s lack of centre and 
coherence.  From the point of view of Nietzsche and Deleuze, we could say that 
Ghirlandaio’s work, in its very lack of centre, in its displacing of Christ by the mundanity of 
a console, in the sense of a multiplicity of different things occurring at the same time within 
the fresco, is a celebration of life which, whilst undoubtedly composed, does not subsume 
it under a unitary ideal.  We could perhaps say that this is the Christ and events of the 
messy empirically of the gospels, before the advent of an idealised Pauline Christianity. 
 
Wölfflin’s earlier Renaissance and Baroque is concerned with architecture, and here the 
chilliness of the high renaissance – the early years of the 16th century – is also explicitly 
presented as an ideal from which architecture can and does descend.8  There was a 
“golden age”, and this golden age terminates (for architecture) in 1520, after which “not 
one really pure work was produced.”9  The baroque was something “into which the 
Renaissance degenerated.”10  Wölfflin acknowledges that he is repeating a nihilistic theme 
which had been a staple of architectural history for the preceding two hundred years, and 
it is clear that he does not himself depreciate the baroque in this way.  But his analysis of 
the architecture of the 16th century is nonetheless conceptually organised around the 
topos of the ideal unified form and the subsequent deliberate removal of that unity.  As 
Werner in his essay on Wölfflin quotes: 
 
Maß und Form, Einfalt und Linienadel, Stille der Seele und sanfte Empfindung, das 
waren die großen Orte seines Kunstevangeliums. Krystallhelles Wasser sein 
Lieblingssymbol. – Man setzt das Gegentheil eines jeden dieser Begriffe und man 
hat das Wesen der neuen Kunst bezeichnet.11 
 
However, as Werner noted in his call for papers, in Renaissance and Baroque the 
disjunction between the unified ideal of the early years of the cinquecento and the 
“baroque” into which it descends is characteristic not of what we would now generally call 
baroque architecture. For early Wölfflin, baroque architecture virtually terminates rather 
than begins with Carlo Maderno at the turn of the 17th century.  The contrast between unity 
and deliberate lack of unity in architectural composition is a contrast between high 
renaissance and what we now call mannerism, exemplified perhaps most clearly in the 
Roman works of Bramante on the one hand and that of Michelangelo on the other. 
 
It is in 1915 with Principles of Art History that Wölfflin fully addresses 17th and 18th century 
baroque and rococo.  The subtitle of the book – “The problem of the Development of Style 
                                                 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, London: Athlone Press, 1983. 
7 Op. cit., 33, 34, 96. 
8 Heinrich Wölfflin, Renaissance and Baroque, trans. Kathrin Simon, London: Collins, 1964. 
9 Op. cit., 17. 
10 Op. cit., 15. 
11 Heinrich Wölfflin, Renaissance und Barock, München 1888: 74, quoted in Werner Oechslin, ‚„Das Wort ‚klassisch‘ hat für 
uns etwas Erkältendes.“ (Heinrich Wölfflin)’, in Welche Antike? Konkurrierende Rezeptionen des Altertums im Barock, 
ed. Ulrich Heinen, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011, 186.  The English translation of this passage is very poor. 
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in Later Art” – again makes explicit that the conceptual framework of the discussion will 
derive from the positing of an ideal or origin from which “late” work is then derived.  This 
time, the characteristics which are analysed are: 
 linear and painterly (a neologism for malerisch) 
 plane and recession 
 closed and open form 
 multiplicity and unity 
 clearness and unclearness 
 
and the position of the high renaissance prototype has apparently altered somewhat from 
his analysis 15 years earlier.  Unity is no longer posited as characteristic of the classic; on 
the contrary, classic architecture has a multiplicity to it which is aligned with its clearness 
and linear qualities, whereas later – baroque and rococo - art and architecture combines 
unity with a painterly quality and a certain unclearness.  Again, two or three examples will 
serve: on the one hand, Alberti’s Palazzo Rucellai, where the architectural elements are 
each clearly and in linear manner distinguished from each other as a set of multiple pieces 
each of which have their own integrity and which, in principle, seem to be able to extend 
as far as necessary in any direction, the unfinished right edge of the facade only serving to 
emphasise this quality.  Or – another example which Wölfflin himself gives – the Palazzo 
della Cancelleria.  On the other hand, almost any canonical work of baroque or rococo 
architecture will serve to justify a formal characterisation of unity (rather than a multiplicity 
of individually distinct elements) and an unclearness and painterliness of overall form.  
(San Carlo, St Gallen). 
 
We can construct a table of what constitutes the classic and its antithesis in each case: 
 
 Renaissance and 
Baroque (1888) 
Classic Art (1899) Principles of Art 
History (1915) 
Classic Linear 
Calm 
Grace  
Static  
Repose, 
spaciousness, mass 
and size; 
Simplification and 
lucidity; 
Complexity; 
Unity and 
inevitability 
Linear 
Planar  
Closed 
Multiple 
Clear 
Baroque (1888) 
= mannerist 
Painterly (malerisch) 
Grand 
Massive 
Movement 
  
Baroque and rococo 
(1915) 
  Painterly (malerisch) 
Recession 
Open form 
Unity 
Unclearness 
 
How to interpret the differences between these classifications, and in particular the 
displacement of the value of unity from classic across to the baroque?  The question as to 
whether unity applies or does not apply to the classic might depend on what you compare 
it with (mannerism or the baroque); or might well depend on the specifics of the examples 
chosen.  After all, the Rucellai façade is a multiple thing which we can imagine extended to 
infinity: would we say the same thing of the Rucellai tomb - which seems to me to have a 
distinct unifying sense to it.  Alternatively, the change could be a symptom of the 
slipperiness of names, an inherent problem of nomination: we could say that the classic 
quality of unity which is seen in Leonardo’s Last Supper comes to be renamed clearness 
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in the 1915 classification.  Or it could be that there are numerous ways of creating a 
unified work of art or architecture in the sense that Alberti intended (following from 
Aristotle’s poetics) when he required that the work should be such as to allow no additions 
or subtractions without spoiling its perfection – a principle that Wölfflin quotes a number of 
times in support of his thesis.  Unity (or the lack of it) would therefore be operating on a 
number of levels: at the highest level of abstraction it could be said that Alberti’s unity 
holds true of any work of art or architecture worthy of the name, whereas on a more 
concrete level of comparison between specific works or styles of art, unity and lack of unity 
would become a continuum by which to classify things. 
 
Or are these differences symptomatic of the inherent limitations of any formal analysis in 
its application to empirical history?  An iconographic or hermeneutic analysis would tend to 
disenfranchise the whole idea of defining something like the baroque or the classic in 
terms of form.  However, that a mode of thought is inexact and open to ambiguity does not 
necessarily invalidate it – perhaps the contrary.  Wölfflin himself is careful to state that the 
art work is much more than just form – a warning which is all too often ignored.12  We 
should be careful to make a distinction between analysis and ontology.  What is helpful in 
analysis, in the drawing of distinctions between phenomena (individual works of art, or 
styles), is not necessarily relevant or helpful in determining what the being of a work 
consists of; and conversely, the ontology of a work – a statement of what it is – does not of 
itself provide a criteria for analysis. 
 
Nonetheless, we can summarise and say that for Wölfflin, the Classic is unified or clear 
phenomena – that is, a concept that is determined by a certain oneness or identity - and 
can be ascertained formally by an analysis of the form of the work. 
 
 
 
 
In his various works on the 17th century thinkers Spinoza and Leibnitz, whose work he 
links with a specifically Baroque conception of the world, Gilles Deleuze contrasts their 
philosophies with “classic” philosophy, which runs as a stream from Aristotle through to 
Descartes (and beyond, to Kant).  Classic philosophy is essentialist13, whereby a thing is 
defined as that which fulfils its essence to a greater or lesser extent; and it is substantialist 
whereby a thing is defined as substance and therefore as form.  As Deleuze and Guattari 
state: 
Classicism refers to form-matter relation, or rather a form-substance relation 
(substance is precisely a matter endowed with form).  
 
As Deleuze says, substance is, at bottom, form.  There is therefore a non-coincidental 
coherence between Wölfflin’s formal method of ascertaining what classic art is, and the 
nature – in general – of the classic as defined philosophically.  The classic is defined in 
classic fashion – by means of a unified essence and the form of a substance. 
 
Deleuze is fascinated by the baroque style, as well as baroque thought, and he uses 
Wölfflin’s formal analysis – largely from Renaissance and Baroque – a number of times in 
his book on the baroque fold, a book which calls into question this classical mode of 
thought.  It is as if within the formal characteristics of the style, one could find a hint as to 
the overcoming of the classical notion of form.  Baroque architecture is not only “late” or 
derivative in relation to a unified or clear renaissance ideal architecture: it potentially calls 
into question the basis on which we would define something as ideal in the first place, or 
rather “the ideal” as a category of thought in itself.  This in turn would address the 
Deleuzian/Nietzschean theme mentioned above of nihilism.  We could say that the setting 
                                                 
12 Heinrich Wölfflin, Classic Art, 288. 
13 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold –Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, London: Athlone Press, 1993, 56. 
  Tim Gough  Unity and inevitability: Classic/Baroque and the universal page 5 
 
 
up of an ideal style and then the derivation of later styles from that as a process of formal 
degeneration or development in the manner of Wölfflin is a way of overcoming a pure 
empiricism of history - but a nihilistic way of doing so.  Now what is interesting about 
Deleuze is that he often claims to be an empiricist, but a strange sort of empiricist who 
finally calls for a transcendental empiricism.14  Here, transcendental is distinguished from 
transcendent.  Rather than imposing a concept on our intramundane existence, what 
Deleuze is searching for are concepts which are immanent to that existence.  Returning to 
our examples of the Last Supper, we could say that Leonardo’s is the exposition of a 
transcendent concept of formal unity which tends towards a nihilism depreciating the 
intramundane world; whereas Ghirlandaio’s concept remains immanent to that world by 
respecting its inherent multiplicity and lack of centre. 
 
If there is a clear coherence between the abstract thought of classicism, the way in which 
classic art and architecture is defined, and the identified formal characteristics of classic 
art, then the question would be whether a similar link can be made between the anti-
classic philosophers of the baroque age and baroque architecture. 
 
For Deleuze, the definition of the baroque is inherently problematic.  As he says, it is 
questionable whether the baroque even exists: 
It is nonetheless strange to deny the existence of the Baroque in the way we speak 
of unicorns or herds of pink elephants. For in this case the concept is given, while in 
the case of the Baroque the question entails knowing if a concept can be invented 
that is capable (or not) of attributing existence to it.  Irregular pearls exist, but the 
Baroque has no reason for existing without a concept that forms this very reason. It 
is easy to call the Baroque inexistent; it suffices not to propose its concept.15 
 
But this concept of the baroque does not need to refer to an essence.  For instance, 
Spinoza's question is not about essence, but about power: he famously asks in the Ethics: 
what can a body do?  The thing (architecture and art included) is, and is regarded as, no 
longer a substance with a form, but a collection of relations, a series of nested 
individualities to infinity, or, in the case of Leibniz, a series of folds to infinity.  The 
relational character of reality extends, for the baroque, to the mathematics of integration 
and differentiation – dx/dy as the subsistence of the relation in the absence of its terms.  
This, for Deleuze, is what characterises baroque thought: the introduction of a notion of 
the “fold to infinity” which is taken directly from certain formal characteristics of baroque art 
(especially Bernini’s sculpture).  But what is demanded here is that the formalism of the 
fold be taken to the limit, beyond the classical question of form and substance.  The folds 
of St Teresa’s clothing are taken as indicative of folds within folds within folds, to infinity.  In 
other words, the fold becomes primary relative to substance.  It is not that there exists a 
substance which comes to be folded, but rather that the fold is made up only of smaller 
folds, just as Leibniz says that “the machines of nature, namely living organisms, are still 
machines even in their smallest parts, ad infinitum.”16 The little machine is a little fold, and 
what is disavowed is any substantial final atom from which those machines or folds would 
be made.  Substance, rather, is merely an after-effect of those folds or relations to infinity. 
 
We can see this fold within fold, or machine within machine, echoed within the formal 
structure of baroque architecture, even at the outset.  Carlo Maderno’s work, as I have 
argued elsewhere,17 exhibits this formal structure of inclusion, evident for instance in his 
very distinctive use of double pediments both at Santa Susanna and on the rear façade of 
the Villa Aldobrandini (note this is a speculative reconstruction of the pediment – the 
                                                 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence – Essays on a life, trans. Anne Boyman, New York: Zone Books, 2005, 25. 
15 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold –Leibniz and the Baroque, 33, 
16 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Monadology, trans. Nicholas Rescher, London: Routledge, 1991, section 64, 25. 
17 Tim Gough, A structure of Carlo Maderno’s work, paper at Carlo Maderno Architetto e ingegnere nella Roma 
barocca, Convegno internazionale a cura di Axel Christoph Gampp, November 2006. 
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original outer one having been removed).  Further examples of this formal structure of 
inclusion can be seen in the windows of the Palazzo Barbarini and the entrance to the 
staircase of Palazzo Mattei; these can be interpreted as perspectival in nature, but what 
we are seeing here too is the inclusion of elements or frames within frames.  Perhaps we 
could argue that it is this nesting or folding to infinity which finally distinguishes, at the 
beginning of the 17th century, the onset of baroque architecture, and in this regard see a 
formal consonance between architecture and the possibilities for a non-classical 
philosophy (which is also a non-Cartesian philosophy). 
 
Similar structures are to be found in key examples of baroque architecture, in the work of 
Borromini, Pietro da Cortona (at Santi Luca e Martina and Santa Maria della Pace) and 
very distinctively in the work of Guarini.  At the other end of what we might broadly term 
the baroque, we can see these folds within folds, machines within machines in the work of 
the brothers Asam at Weltenburg. 
 
Conversely, there is a classicism of the baroque period and of the 17th century more 
generally that seems to me to be defined by its lack of interest in such structures.  It has 
been said of Bernini that he was baroque in plan but not in elevation18; however, I see little 
evidence of the baroque in either plan or elevation of much of his architectural work, 
unless we define the baroque plan merely in terms of a penchant for the ellipse; here at 
Castel Gandolfo, or even at San Andrea on the Quirinale, or indeed in the colonnade at St 
Peters, which is surely neo-classical in spirit.  Moving beyond Italy, the French were 
singularly uninterested in the baroque: we can see in Perrault, Francois Blondel and 
others an avoidance of anything resembling the complex structures of the Roman baroque 
or the anti-Cartesianism of Spinoza or Leibniz.  Both of these sets of examples reflect the 
nature of the classical in another sense; Bernini, in his architecture, tends towards the 
position of the academy, of the professional once removed from the day-to-day work and 
understanding of the guildsman.  He tends towards Alberti’s suggestion that the architect 
should present a set of drawings to site and not actually get involved in the implementation 
of the idea. Perrault and Blondel of course exemplify the professionalism of the French 
academy, ie the disjunction of the design from the implementation.  Here we see a “return” 
to the ideal, to the nihilistic tendency to depreciate the intramundane in the name of the 
classical ideal: in essence, the academy posits a chilly realm of thought and activity on the 
part of the architect, a realm of the idea transcendent to the world in which it comes to 
exist.  This is famously in contrast to Borromini, whose architecture is predicated on his 
activities as a craftsman; likewise the Asam brothers and really the whole of the rococo, 
which relies on an intimate relation and interplay between craft and idea; and of course in 
contrast to Bernini himself when he forgoes architecture and engages directly with 
material in his sublime sculpture. 
 
What is at stake here is the manner in which we escape from a pure empiricism or 
nominalism.  How do we posit or work with the universal, with that which allows us to 
throw the concept or the idea across time, to draw connections between disparate 
phenomena?  Deleuze’s fascination with Wölfflin’s formalism and his conception of the 
baroque allows us to see hinted in baroque architecture an alternative to the unity and 
seeming inevitability of the classic philosophical notion of form and substance.  
Paradoxically, it is by pushing form to the limit – something we see in the extremity of the 
best of baroque and rococo architecture – that formalism, and with it nihilism, can be 
overcome and a non-classical ontology discovered. 
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18 By Peter Carl 
